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Abstract—In April 2003 the U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission proposed the Wholesale Power Market Platform
(WPMP) for adoption by all U.S. wholesale power markets.
The WPMP market design envisions day-ahead, real-time,
and ancillary service markets maintained and operated by an
independent system operator or regional transmission organi-
zation. Previous work reports on the development of an agent-
based model for testing the economic reliability of the WPMP
market design. This paper reports on the implementation of
this model as an agent-based computational laboratory. Initial
experiments focusing on optimal power flow solution methods
for the day-ahead and real-time markets are also discussed.
I. Introduction
Electricity generators participating in restructured
wholesale power markets must make repeated price and
quantity offers for the sale of power. Typically the number
of these generators is relatively small, and some have rel-
atively large market shares. Moreover, generator supplies
must continually be balanced in real time against the
demands of load-serving entities in order to maintain the
stable operation of the transmission grid.
These characteristics provide generators with a poten-
tially large scope for the exercise of strategic behavior.
They can use their offers as signaling or punishment
devices in an attempt to support profitably higher prices
across generators (general seller market power). They can
also attempt to create locally profitable price spikes (local
seller market power) either by withholding capacity from
the market or by deliberately inducing congestion on local
transmission lines to prevent the import of external power.
The summer 2000 meltdown in the restructured Cali-
fornia wholesale power market is thought to have resulted
in part from strategic generator behaviors encouraged by
inappropriate market design features ([1], [19]). Other
regions of the country, fearing similar disaster, have
reacted by delaying or even halting their restructuring
efforts.
For the restructuring of wholesale power markets, then,
it is highly desirable to test the economic reliability of
proposed market designs in advance of implementation.
In the short run, the market designs should support the
efficient production and allocation of power from existing
facilities, as well as appropriate limitations on the ability
of market participants to exercise market power through
strategic behavior. In the longer run, the market designs
should encourage the efficient development and siting of
new transmission lines and new generation capacity.
In June 2002, the U.S. Federal Energy Regulatory Com-
mission (FERC) issued a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
advocating a standard market design for common adoption
by all U.S. wholesale power markets [6]. After an extended
period of discussion and criticism, FERC issued a White
Paper [7] proposing a revised design referred to as the
Wholesale Power Market Platform (WPMP).
The WPMP design encompasses real-time and day-
ahead markets, ancillary services, and the recommended
use of locational marginal pricing and tradable financial
transmission rights. All of these aspects are to be over-
seen either by an Independent System Operator (ISO)
or a Regional Transmission Organization (RTO). FERC
highlights four primary objectives for this design. First,
it should establish a customer-based competitive whole-
sale power market providing reliable service. Second, it
should ensure fair and open access to the transmission
grid at reasonable prices. Third, it should induce good
price signals to encourage appropriate investment in new
generation and transmission. Fourth, it should provide for
effective market oversight and market power mitigation.
Variants of the WPMP design have been implemented or
accepted for implementation in several regions of the U.S.
The basic WPMP architecture was strongly influenced
by the wholesale power market designs implemented in
the 1990s by the ISOs in New York (NYISO) and the
Mid-Atlantic States (PJM). In March 2003 the ISO in
New England (ISO-NE) implemented a Standard Market
Design (SMD) which is in basic compliance with FERC’s
originally proposed standard market design and hence also
with the WPMP. The California ISO (CAISO) filed to
adopt the WPMP soon after the issuance of FERC’sWhite
Paper. The Midwest ISO (MISO) filed for adoption of
the WPMP in July 2003, withdrew this filing in October
2003 due to strongly expressed stakeholder concerns, and
then refiled in May 2004 for adoption in March 2005.
Texas (ERCOT) currently plans to launch a version of
the WPMP in October 2006.
On the other hand, strong opposition to the WPMP de-
sign persists among stakeholders in the Southeast and the
Northwest, and even in regions such as the Midwest which
have filed to adopt the design. Much of this opposition
appears to arise from three perceived concerns: inadequate
reliability testing of the WPMP design; stranded costs and
benefits; and inadequate accommodation in the WPMP
design for special local conditions (e.g., relatively heavy
reliance on hydroelectric power in the Northwest).
Unfortunately, the complexity of the WPMP design
makes it difficult to test its economic reliability using stan-
dard analytical and statistical tools. A recent statistical
study [4] by the U.S. Department of Energy investigates
the potential for consumer cost savings under the original
standard market design [6] proposed by FERC. However,
this DOE study includes many cautions regarding model-
ing assumptions introduced for reasons of analytical and
statistical tractability (e.g., continual market equilibrium,
absence of strategic bidding, and demand held constant
across tested cases). Moreover, no attempt is made to
assess overall market efficiency or market power impacts.
Research groups at a number of different institutions are
now undertaking the agent-based modeling of wholesale
and retail electricity markets.1 In particular, Koesrindar-
toto and Tesfatsion [16] report on their development of an
agent-based model for testing the economic reliability of
the WPMP design in advance of implementation. Specifi-
cally, this model consists of strategic generators and load-
serving entities participating in a dynamic ISO-operated
wholesale power market whose architecture embodies core
features of the WPMP design as implemented in New
England’s SMD. This appears to be the first agent-based
model specifically designed to study the WPMP/SMD
protocols.
1These institutions include the Los Alamos National Labora-
tory, the Argonne National Laboratory, Carnegie-Mellon University,
CSIRO-Australia, Helsinki University, Iowa State University, London
Business School, the Pacific Northwest National Laboratory, and the
Sandia National Laboratory. See [28] for annotated pointers to some
of this work. See also [12] and [29] for introductory readings and web
resources on agent-based economic modeling.
The present paper reports on the implementation of this
WPMP/SMD model as a computational laboratory using
Repast,2 a toolkit designed specifically for agent-based
modeling. This computational laboratory, referred to as
AMES (Agent-based Modelling of Electricity Systems),
is being used to test the extent to which the core
WPMP/SMD protocols are capable of sustaining efficient,
orderly, and fair market outcomes over time despite
attempts by market participants to gain individual ad-
vantage through strategic pricing, capacity withholding,
and induced transmission congestion.
II. The Basic AMES Framework
A. Background: WPMP/SMD Design Features
Locational Marginal Pricing (LMP) is the pricing of
electrical power according to the location of its withdrawal
from, or injection into, a transmission grid. The idea of
LMP for power markets was apparently first advocated in
[25]. In recent years it has gained widespread acceptance as
the correct pricing approach for wholesale power markets
restructured as centralized or pool-based trading systems
managed by some form of system operator.
The LMP at any given pricing location k on a commer-
cial network overlaying a physical transmission grid is the
minimum incremental cost of servicing one additional unit
of load (i.e., demand) at k, taking into account production
costs, congestion costs, and transmission losses through
energy dissipation. Congestion costs and transmission
losses can arise if the least-cost servicing of the additional
unit of load requires additional generation at a pricing
location other than k.
In July 2002, FERC issued a Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking (NOPR) advocating the common adoption
of a standard market design by all U.S. wholesale power
markets [6]. This design was based on an LMP approach
to the pricing of power. Specifically, it called for the
establishment of wholesale power markets incorporating
the following core features as a complement to direct
buyer-seller bilateral procurement:
• A transmission system operated by an independent
transmission organization;
• Administration by the independent transmission or-
ganization of a day-ahead market for forward financial
contracts and a real-time (spot) market for balancing
and settlement;
• Transmission congestion management by means of
LMP;
• Provision of tradable Financial Transmission Rights
(FTRs) in the day-ahead market as a means to lock-in
a fixed price for transmission service;
2Originally developed by researchers at the University of Chicago
and the Argonne National Laboratory, Repast is now managed by
the non-profit volunteer organization ROAD (Repast Organization
for Architecture and Development). See [30] for a comprehensive
Repast self-study guide that includes annotated links to readings,
tutorials, and software downloads.
• Provision of ancillary services (e.g., regular resource
adequacy assessments to ensure real-time balancing
of power inflows and outflows);
• Procedures for monitoring and for market power
mitigation in the real-time market.
The New England wholesale power market constitutes
part of the Eastern Interconnect, a large AC transmission
grid that serves the majority of the Eastern United States
and parts of Canada ([2],[3]). The New England Indepen-
dent System Operator (ISO-NE), created in 1997, is a not-
for-profit organization responsible for the administration
of New England’s wholesale power market. On March
1, 2003, the ISO-NE implemented the Standard Market
Design (SMD) for the New England wholesale power
market. As explained in the ISO-NE’s SMD Reference
Guide [9], the SMD is fully compliant with the standard
market design proposed in FERC’s 2002 NOPR.
In April 2003, in response to comments received on its
2002 NOPR, FERC issued a White Paper in which it
revised its originally proposed standard market design in
three principal ways [7]. First, it clarified the requirements
for an ISO or Regional Transmission Organization (RTO)
to qualify as an independent transmission organization.
Second, it clarified the requirements for market power
mitigation. Third, it relaxed several requirements of the
original standard market design to allow for more re-
gional flexibility (e.g., use of LMP and FTRs to manage
congestion is now strongly recommended rather than
required). The revised standard market design was named
the Wholesale Power Market Platform (WPMP). New
England’s SMD remains in close conformity with this
revised standard market design.
B. Overview of AMES
Our primary objective is to test the economic reliability
of the basic WPMP design by means of systematic
computational experiments. As explained in Section II-
A, the Standard Market Design (SMD) implemented for
the New England wholesale power market in March 2003
is a rubber-meets-the-road implementation of the WPMP
design.
Our computational laboratory implementation of a
wholesale power market - referred to as AMES (Agent-
based Modelling of Electricity Systems) - incorporates in
stylized form several core elements of the WPMP design
as implemented in New England’s SMD. By adhering
closely to the architecture of the SMD, we are able to
take advantage of the voluminous SMD training guides,
operational manuals, and reports publicly released by
the ISO-NE for the use of ISO-NE senior personnel and
general market participants. These publications provide a
wealth of specific implementation details missing from the
more abstract WPMP template.
The two primary guidelines used for the construction
of AMES have been Market Rule 1 [10] and Operations
Manual M-11 [11]. Market Rule 1 lays out general provi-
sions applicable to the operation of the SMD, including
an overview of market operations, calculation of LMPs,
and accounting and billing procedures. M-11 details the
rules and regulations governing the schedule and dispatch
of resources in the SMD. Specifically, it describes the flow
of activities in the market one day prior to a typical
Operating Day as well as during a typical Operating Day
and within a typical Operating Hour.
AMES incorporates the following six core features of
the WPMP/SMD architecture:
1) The participants in the AMES wholesale power
market include an Independent System Operator
(ISO), a collection of Load-Serving Entities (LSEs),
and a collection of Generators.3
2) The AMES ISO undertakes the daily management
of a Day-Ahead Market and a Real-Time Market,
as well as a Supply Re-Offer period for Generators.
3) The AMES ISO determines commitments and LMP
pricing for the Day-Ahead Market based on Gener-
ator supply offers and LSE demand bids (forward
financial contracting);
4) Any differences that arise at settlement from the
contracts cleared in the Day-Ahead Market are
settled by the AMES ISO in the Real-Time Market
at real-time LMPs.
5) The AMES wholesale power market operates over
an AC transmission grid.
6) Transmission grid congestion is managed via the
inclusion of congestion components in LMPs.
AMES is a fully modular and extensible framework,
capable in principle of handling realistically dimensioned
transmission grids as well as additional architectural
features of the WPMP/SMD design. As explained in the
following section, however, we are initially focusing on
demonstration models operating over small-scale trans-
mission grids that have from two to five buses (branch
connection points).4
3An ISO is an organization charged with the primary responsibility
of maintaining the security of a power system and often with system
operation responsibilities as well. The ISO is “independent” to the
extent that it does not have a conflict of interest in carrying out
these responsibilities, such as an ownership stake in generation or
transmission facilities within the power system. An LSE is an electric
utility, transmitting utility, or Federal power marketing agency that
has an obligation under Federal, State, or local law, or under long-
term contracts, to provide electrical power to end-use (residential or
commercial) consumers or to other LSEs with end-use consumers.
An LSE aggregates individual end-use consumer demand into “load
blocks” for bulk buying at the wholesale level. A Generator is a
company that produces and sells electrical power in bulk at the
wholesale level. For more precise definitions as set out by the North
American Electric Reliability Council (NERC), see [20].
4Here we follow the dictum of Kirschen and Strbac [15, p. 175]:
“Never trust a technique proven on the basis of a two-bus system.”
III. Experimental Design
A. Overview
AMES permits systematic experimentation to explore
the sensitivity of wholesale market performance to changes
in structural features and behavioral assumptions when
the market is operating under basic WPMP/SMD proto-
cols. Six issues of particular interest have been selected
for this long-term project:
(1) What effects on Optimal Power Flow (OPF)
and LMP solutions are observed when the
AMES ISO uses alternative solution methods
(e.g., DC power flow approximation) for Bid-
Based Security-Constrained Unit Commitment
(BSCUC) and for Security-Constrained Eco-
nomic Dispatch (SCED) in the Day-Ahead Mar-
ket and the Real-Time Market, respectively?
(2) What effects on market performance are observed
when the AMES Generators use alternative learn-
ing methods to determine their supply offers for
the Day-Ahead Market?
(3) What effects on market performance are observed
when the AMES LSEs use alternative learning
methods to determine their demand bids for the
Day-Ahead Market?
(4) What effects on longer-run market power out-
comes are observed for different initial specifica-
tions of relative market concentration (i.e., the
number and sizes of Generators relative to the
number and sizes of LSEs)?
(5) What effects on market performance are observed
when market participants are permitted to pur-
chase Financial Transmission Rights (with or
without a secondary market for resale)?
(6) What effects on market performance are observed
when market participants can self-schedule bilat-
eral trades?
The next subsection discusses in greater detail our planned
experiments for issue (1).
B. OPF Solution Methods for BSCUC and SCED
Discussion:
The BSCUC and SCED activities carried out by the
AMES ISO each involve the solution of an OPF problem.
In the AMES Day-Ahead Market the objective function for
the OPF problem is the maximization of total net benefits
conditional on supply offers and demand bids and on var-
ious transmission-related constraints. In the AMES Real-
Time Market the objective function for the OPF problem
is the minimization of total variable cost conditional on
uncleared day-ahead supply offers, any in-day deviations
in generation and load from day-ahead commitments, and
various transmission related constraints.
The Newton-Raphson method [31] is now commonly
used in the electric power industry to determine solutions
to OPF problems in either form. For example, based on
his experiences as a principal engineer of power supply
planning at ISO-NE, Rau [24, Chapter 8, Appendix B]
considers a number of illustrative electricity markets both
with and without demand-side bidding to reflect the
organizational form of the day-ahead market and real-time
market, respectively, in the ISO-NE. He uses the Newton-
Raphson option provided in Microsoft’s Excel Solver to
obtain one-time OPF solutions for each of these illustrative
markets.
Nevertheless, as is well known, realistically rendered
OPF problems are complicated constrained nonlinear
programming (NLP) problems that can be difficult to
solve using the Newton-Raphson method. Convergence
to a solution can be exceedingly slow if the surrounding
region is “flat.” The method can also become entrapped
at local optima. Finally, the method can fail to converge
within a practical amount of time (or at all) if the initial
starting point is not sufficiently close to a solution point, or
if calculations become ill-conditioned along the successive
approximation path due to bifurcations or other nonlinear
phenomena. The more complicated the nature of the
constraints, the more likely these problems are to arise.
Difficulties of similar magnitude are encountered applying
other NLP solution methods as well, such as the lambda
iteration method, general gradient methods, interior point
methods, and various other approaches based on successive
linear approximation. See, for example, the introductory
discussion in [21].
In recognition of these problems, the ISO-NE regu-
larly uses a linearized DC power flow approximation
for security-constrained economic dispatch in the New
England Real-Time Market. A full AC OPF analysis is
only undertaken for “suspicious contingencies” [17, pp. 22-
23,34], meaning contingencies whose indicated conse-
quences appear to be more serious. This greatly simplifies
and speeds up the required real-time calculations.
What evidence exists regarding the magnitude and
potential importance of the errors resulting from linearized
DC approximations? Overbye et al. [21, p. 8] conclude
that, for the static (single period) comparative calculations
they carried out for two specific case studies, a DC power
flow approximation did a “fairly good job of revealing the
congestion patterns that would actually occur using the
full AC system model.” Although significant deviations
were found in the number of binding constraints, and in
LMP values at some buses, the authors note that this is to
be expected; small differences in branch flows can result
in changes in the set of binding constraints, which in turn
can result in discrete and potentially large differences in
bus LMPs.
However, in a study of reactive power support examining
the performance of a linearized DC approximation for
the solution of a NLP reactive OPF problem, Pudjianto
et al. (2002) were less sanguine about their findings.
Although the overall reactive requirement calculated by
the DC approximation was reasonably accurate, the au-
thors found that the individual generator commitments
resulting from the DC approximation varied considerably
from the commitments resulting from the direct solution
of the NLP reactive OPF problem using an interior point
algorithm.
From an economic point of view, the sharp discrepancies
found in these studies between the LMPs derived for a
power system using a DC power flow approximation and
the LMPs derived for the same power system using full
AC power flow constraints is disturbing. LMP pricing in
restructured wholesale power markets is supposed to pro-
vide correct signals for the efficient use of scarce existing
transmission and generation facilities.5 Moreover, it seems
fair to say that little is known about the magnitude and
importance of dynamic error accumulation when a DC
power flow model is used in “tracking mode” to obtain
approximate OPF solutions in rapid succession for a real-
time market operating over an AC transmission grid, as
in the ISO-NE.6
Treatment:
A core part of AMES is a RePast/Java module for
generating OPF/LMP solutions both with and without
demand-side bidding. Gross [8] and Weber [32] have been
important guides in the development of our OPF problem
formulation. Weber, in particular, discusses in great detail
the possible application of the Newton-Raphson method
to the solution of the classic OPF problem for AC
transmission grids.7
The Weber OPF problem formulation has apparently
been incorporated into a proprietary commercial software
product, Simulator (PowerWorld Inc.), originally devel-
oped in [22]. Some non-proprietary software is available for
OPF problems, such as the Matlab tookits PSAT (Power
System Analysis Toolbox) developed by Milano [18]
and MATPOWER developed by Zimmerman, Murillo-
Sanchez, and Gan [33]. However, the vast majority of the
available software products for solving OPF problems are
5Whether LMP pricing is capable, even in principle, of providing
correct signals for the efficient development and siting of new
transmission and generation facilities remains controversial. See, for
example, [15, p. 256].
6Tracking mode refers to the common practice of using a previously
calculated solution as the starting point for calculating a next needed
solution.
7As a cautionary note, Weber’s otherwise excellent presentation of
the AC OPF problem includes several typographical errors, duplicate
uses of notation, and incomplete or delayed explanations of variable
relationships which could be confusing for non-engineers.
proprietary.8
Moreover, we have been unable to find any open-
source OPF software in Java, our chosen development
language for AMES. Ultimately it might become necessary
to port to a different language, perhaps with distributed
processing, to ensure sufficient capability to handle power
systems scaled up to more realistic dimensions. Scalability
is particularly important for the most time-critical aspect
of the WPMP/SMD: namely, security-constrained eco-
nomic dispatch for the real-time market requiring accurate
continually-updated assessments of real-time conditions
in the overall power system (“state estimation”). For
now, however, our basic aim is to develop a user-friendly
wholesale power market framework permitting intensive
computational experimentation on small-scale problems
incorporating both strategic market participants and re-
alistically rendered transmission constraints.
We are currently using the AMES framework to investi-
gate the extent to which satisfactory OPF and LMP solu-
tions can be obtained for the Day-Ahead and Real-Time
Markets operating through time over an AC transmission
grid under the WPMP/SMD protocols. Experiments are
being conducted with both two-bus and three-bus trans-
mission grids to explore the effects of loop-flow effects
on market performance as we move from the two-bus to
the three-bus case. In addition, we plan to investigate
the nature of error accumulation when AC constraints are
replaced by a linearized DC power flow approximation.
As a longer term goal, we also plan to explore the
potential applicability to OPF problems of previously
developed automatic differentiation, adaptive homotopy
continuation, and nonlocal sensitivity techniques ([13],
[14], [26], [27]). These techniques are designed for pa-
rameterized nonlinear systems of equations of the form
F (x, βo) = 0. Given relatively weak regularity conditions
on the system function F (·), the techniques permit the
accurate and efficient determination of system solutions
x(βo) as well as the “nonlocal sensitivity” tracking of
solution branches x(β) as the parameter vector β moves
along a specified path of interest. The techniques ac-
complish this by implementing three design criteria that
could be critically important for OPF problems: (i) all
derivative evaluations should be exact up to round-off
and truncation error and automatically generated; (ii)
8Examples of proprietary software that incorporates both an
electricity market simulation component and real-time dispatch with
OPF calculations include: EMCAS (Argonne National Laboratory);
Gridview (ABB); LMPSIM (Shaw PTI); MAPS (General Electric);
Marketecture (Los Alamos National Laboratory); PROMOD VI
(Siemens AG); PROSYM (Henwood); and UPLAN (LCG). Exam-
ples of proprietary software that incorporates real-time dispatch
with OPF calculations but no electricity market simulation compo-
nent include: TRACE (EPRI); SCOPE (Nexant/PCA); Simulator
(PowerWorld); PSSE/E (PTI); and IPSA/LMP (UMIST). Finally,
DOE/EIA’s well-known National Energy Modelling System (NEMS)
incorporates an Electricity Market Module (EMM) but assumes
unconstrained dispatch (no transmission constraints or costs); see
EIA [5].
all algebraic operations should be replaced by ordinary
differential equation operations to improve the stability
of numerical operations; and (iii) the computation should
be adaptive in the sense that the trajectory along which
calculation proceeds adapts locally in order to step around
regions where calculations become ill-conditioned, e.g.,
neighborhoods of saddle-node bifurcation points.9
IV. Conclusion
In this initial development phase, only core elements
of the WPMP/SMD design have been incorporated into
AMES and many simplifications have been made. How-
ever, AMES is modular and extensible. Additional aspects
of the WPMP/SMD design can be incorporated at a
later time to more fully reflect its dynamic operational
capabilities. Chief among these aspects are ancillary ser-
vices (e.g., operating reserves, regulation, and installed
capacity), contingency analysis, and market power mit-
igation procedures. We envision the slow building up of
AMES through an iterative participatory process involving
stakeholders and researchers engaging in multiple loopings
through a three-stage cycle: field study; model design; and
computational experiments.
Our longer-run goal is to have AMES provide a
useful component in larger-scale critical infrastructure
frameworks encompassing regions of the U.S. where the
WPMP/SMD design has been implemented or proposed
for adoption.
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